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The ensuing analysis found that the council was in such dire financial straits, it 
shouldn’t have come as a surprise. Since then, there have been numerous reports 
arguing that local governments all over the country are facing serious financial 
sustainability crises. 
The example of Central Darling Shire plays into the common misconception 
that potholes and dilapidated play equipment are as a direct result of council’s 
inadequate revenue. This report takes a close look at that claim, and finds that council 
expenditures have grown, on average, 7.3 per cent per year for the past twenty years. 
This report delves deeply into the financial issues facing most local councils and 
finds that in fact, many local governments are suffering from expenditure problems 
due to demand from the community that has been rising steeply over two decades. 
Driving this increase in community demand is a gap that has emerged between 
the community’s propensity to pay for various amenities and the cost to council in 
providing those services. This has resulted in local governments under-charging and 
failing to effectively demonstrate the cost to consumers. 
The report makes a series of 18 recommendations that are designed to promote the 
transparency, accountability and equity of local government operations and revenue-
raising capabilities. 
Local governments are an important part of our community. They provide the services 
that we, as citizens, rely heavily 
on: waste management, roads 
maintenance, and the provision 
of local libraries and public 
swimming pools, to name 
a few. This report makes a 
series of recommendations 
that, if implemented in a 
coordinated fashion, will allow 
local governments to provide 
the goods and services they 
promise, in an efficient and 
sustainable manner: because 
no one can afford for more 
councils in Australia to fail due to 
financial difficulties. 
When the Central Darling Shire local council in far-west  
New South Wales was suspended at the end of 2013, it sent 
shock-waves throughout other local governments across the 
country: it was the first ever local government in Australia to fail.
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In the two decades from 1995 to 2015, Australian local governments 
experienced a fourfold increase in expenditure. This represents  
7.3 per cent per annum compound growth rate. Even more  
striking though, is that during this same period many local 
governments were stripped of their water and sewerage functions  
– so these figures actually underrepresent the real picture. 
Executive Summary
An increase in local government expenditure is 
not in and of itself problematic, but if the current 
level of spending continues then there needs to 
be a corresponding increase in council revenues. 
This is relatively unlikely as Australians would 
not be willing to substantially increase their local 
council rates each year, for twenty years. Even if 
state and federal governments provided funding, 
which seems unlikely in the current political 
environment, then the money would still be 
derived from higher levels of tax but just levied by 
other government sources.
At least part of this problem relates to citizens’ 
awareness and perceptions about how local 
government services are paid for. We argue that 
part of the answer to the financial sustainability 
of local governments is to adopt a number of 
broad measures aimed at re-establishing the link 
between demand for local government services 
and the revenue used to meet the demand. When 
citizens can perceive the link between the increase 
in local government services and the price which 
must be paid to fund that increase, then the 
current state of fiscal illusion will be tempered by 
citizens’ willingness to pay.
This report proposes a range of suggestions 
to address the financial sustainability of local 
government. These encompass a number of 
broad measures aimed at re-establishing the 
link between the demand for local government 
services and the revenue used to meet the 
demand. A series of 18 recommendations, 
based on economic and taxation principles, are 
primarily designed to increase the transparency, 
accountability and equity of local government 
revenue-raising efforts. 
The report begins with an overview of local 
government revenue and expenditure. This is 
followed by an examination of the connection 
between revenue and expenditure. This section 
reveals that public taxes are often used to provide 
private benefits. This results in inefficient levels of 
demand due to inadequate price signals and in 
some cases this can lead to a lack of transparency 
and equity. 
Australia already has relatively high levels of land-
based taxes (although in other countries the level 
is on the rise) and there are arguments that there 
is room for further increases, although the picture 




This report finds that the taxation limits (i.e. rate 
capping) which now operate in New South Wales 
and Victoria have a number of harmful effects, 
as they lower levels of efficiency, lower rates of 
infrastructure renewals, increase debt and increase 
levels of inter-jurisdictional inequity. We have 
presented a number of alternatives to address this 
harmful practice.
The report also provides a number of 
recommendations relating to local government 
fees and charges. Of particular note are the 
obstacles to calculating supply and demand. 
It is important that fees and charges are levied 
according to established economic principles. 
In relation to developer levies, which result 
in inefficient economic outcomes, the report 
recommends the adoption of legislation in all 
jurisdictions to establish a developer levy price 
floor and the removal of price ceilings.
Another area that the report examines is 
intergovernmental grants – with a particular 
emphasis on federal financial assistance grants. 
There is evidence of problems with the legislation 
as well as failures of local government grant 
commissions to allocate financial assistance 
grants in a way that is empirically grounded. 
Recommendations are provided to amend 
legislation and to allocate grants at the 
federal rather than the local level. Another 
recommendation is for financial assistance grants 
to be issued in a manner which re-establishes the 
crucial connection between public demand and 
revenue expenditure.
The final area examined in this report is regarding 
additional debt that local councils take on. 
Evidence reveals that when local governments do 
not have good information on which to decide to 
incur more debt, taking on debt has the potential 
to raise intergenerational equity issues. To date, 
little debt capacity modelling has been completed 
for local governments. Calling for councils to take 
on debt without first calculating debt capacity 
is like a bank providing a home loan without 
asking to see customers’ pay slips. Accordingly, 
it is crucial that councils secure good empirical 
evidence about their capacity to service debt. 
While none of these recommendations alone will 
prove to be a solution, together they have the 
potential to address local governments’ financial 
sustainability. If we expect local governments 
to remain an integral part of the governmental 
service delivery model, then we cannot afford to 
remain on the same path.  
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RECOMMENDATION 1  
Local government taxation should only be used 
to fund local government public goods and 
the subsidised component of merit goods and 
positive externality goods. Local government 
taxation is most decidedly not a fee for service.
RECOMMENDATION 2  
The level of subsidy should be justified and clearly 
communicated to donors and recipients. The 
subsidised amount should be displayed on receipts 
and at places where subsidised goods and services 
have been provided.
RECOMMENDATION 3  
Higher tiers of government should be discouraged 
from crowding-out the local government tax 
base. Ideally, retreat by state governments is 
desirable, but may not be practical. Moreover, 
serious consideration should be given to 
returning Capital Gains Tax (CGT) relating to 
subdivision of land to local governments (which 
bear the costs of providing infrastructure 
related to the subdivision). If it is not possible 
for the Australian Taxation Office to identify and 
transfer these amounts to local government 
then the same effect could be achieved by local 
governments levying a tax-deductible fee on 
subdivisions equivalent to CGT liabilities. 
RECOMMENDATION 4  
Exemptions and concessions should be reduced 
and abandoned wherever possible. Welfare is the 
legitimate responsibility of federal governments. 
If exemptions and concessions are desired then 
they should be provided outside of the local 
government tax cycle, to preserve the link between 
revenue and expenditure. These can include 
discounts for pensioners as well as exemptions on 
crown or other government lands.
RECOMMENDATION 5  
Every council should be required to make 
public the calculation method of each of the 
differential rate categories (in an accessible 
form), in order to increase transparency and thus 
reduce opportunity for rent-seeking. Comparative 
differential rate category data (expressed in cents 
in the dollar terms) should be clearly stated on 
all local government rate notices – to increase 
transparency and discourage rent-seeking.
RECOMMENDATION 6  
Rate capping should be abandoned as a matter 
of priority. Local government tax limitations (rate 
capping) erode the link between revenue and 
expenditure and diminish financial efficiency and 
sustainability. 
RECOMMENDATION 7 
A local government ombudsman, with broader 
remits, should be established in each jurisdiction 
to provide opportunity for sanction outside of 
the electoral cycle. The responsibilities of the 
ombudsman could be to review governance issues 
but also rent-seeking activities which disadvantage 
the broader local government taxpayer 
community, and monitor cost-shifting behaviour.
RECOMMENDATION 8 
Councils should be provided with the flexibility 
to make incremental adjustments to local 
government taxation on a quarterly cycle.
RECOMMENDATION 9 
A schedule of fees and charges should be 
publicly available for every council and fully 
justified according to a demand-side or supply-
side approach. This occurs in some jurisdictions, 
however, it is also important for the information 








Regulated fees and charges should be abolished 
on the grounds that they erode the link between 
revenue and expenditure.
RECOMMENDATION 11 
A floor on developer levies should be legislated 
to prevent councils from eschewing developer 
levies entirely, or imposing an inadequate levy 
out of fear of litigation. However, it is important 
that legislation clearly provides councils with the 
opportunity to pursue higher fees and charges 
when justified. In addition, caps on developer 
charges should be removed.
RECOMMENDATION 12 
Intergovernmental grant transfers made with the 
objective of mitigating horizontal fiscal imbalance 
should be paid directly to the local government 
taxpayer by way of a rebate outside of the local 
government tax cycle. This will help to re-assert 
the link between demand and willingness to pay.
RECOMMENDATION 13 
Financial assistance grants should be allocated 
by a central national authority free of political 
interference.
RECOMMENDATION 14 
Financial assistance grants should be linked to 
a predictable and growing source of revenue to 
ensure financially sustainable local government. 
The most likely path to achieving this aim is for 
financial assistance grants to be linked to a share 
of personal and corporate income tax revenues 
for which the allowed amount is no more than 
the existing grant allocation. However, if reform 
of the GST was to be seriously contemplated by 
federal, state and territory governments, then a 
case could be made for local government to be 
allocated a share of this consumption tax.
RECOMMENDATION 15 
Authorities issuing matching grants should be 
conscious of the constraints imposed on councils 
which have limited revenue raising capacity. 
Particularly councils operating in an environment 
dictated by taxation limitations and regulated fees.
RECOMMENDATION 16 
Recommendation: Section 6(2)(b) of the Local 
Government (Financial Assistance) Act 1995 
should be repealed. This section of the Act 
subverts principles of horizontal fiscal equalisation, 
compounding other inequitable stipulations. 
RECOMMENDATION 17 
Financial assistance grants should be allocated 
on the basis of robust empirical methodology 
which principally responds to horizontal fiscal 
imbalance. There already exists an empirically 
robust methodology that has been demonstrated 
in the scholarly literature since at least 1989.
RECOMMENDATION 18 
Recommendation 19: Robust empirical analysis 
of debt capacity should be conducted to support 
the analysis of the suitability of local government 
borrowings. It is imperative that, before local 
governments take on debt, the mechanisms 
for mitigating the moral hazards posed to past 
and future generations are clearly understood. 
Should the preceding significant challenges be 
resolved, there is scope to improve the efficiency 
of debt through the establishment of a bond 
bank or similar institution. Similarly, borrowing 
for infrastructure that can support growth and 
future income can be useful for local governments, 
providing these other issues are first addressed.
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Part 1: Expenditures  
Have Grown, Threatening  
the Financial Sustainability  
of Local Governments
A number of recent inquiries have cast doubt on the financial sustainability 
of the local government sector. For instance, the PwC National Financial 
Sustainability Study of Local Government concluded that ‘approximately 
10% to 30% of Australia’s councils have sustainability issues’* and that these 
councils were principally located in rural and regional areas.1 
In a similar vein, the New South Wales Independent Local Government Review Panel 
concluded that ‘the financial sustainability of many councils – and their capacity to deliver 
the services communities need – has declined, and a significant number are near crisis 
point’.2 Moreover, the recent unprecedented liquidity crisis faced by Central Darling Shire 
in far-western NSW represents the first example of local government failure in Australia.3  
It thus seems prudent to conduct a close examination of the revenue and expenditure 
structures of Australian local government with a view to identify the underlying cause of 
the looming financial sustainability crisis. 
It has been argued that the expanding remit of Australian local government is the 
principal factor behind declining financial sustainability.4 In the last two decades there 
has been a fourfold increase in spending by local government in nominal terms (7.3% p.a. 
compound growth rate) from total outlays of A$8.2 billion in 1994-95 to A$33.6 billion in 
2014-15.5 This is despite the fact that in some jurisdictions (such as NSW and Queensland), 
significant public service responsibilities (such as water and sewerage) have been 
stripped out from local government and are now provided by regional water corporations. 
Moreover, there has been a significant shift in the proportion of local government outlays 
expended in the various functional categories employed by the ABS – the most notable 
changes have been in the expenditure categories of Housing and Community Amenities 
(18.5% in 1994-95 to 24% in 2014-15) and Economic Affairs (from just 0.2% in 1994-95 to 
3.6% in 2014-15).6 What this demonstrates is that both the scale and functional scope of 
local government spending has been the subject of a remarkable amount of change in the 
last two decades.
*  It should be noted that – somewhat alarmingly – despite the conclusions posited in the two cited reports a robust empirical analysis of the financial 
sustainability of all Australian local governments does not currently exist. The PwC (2006) report was based on just a sample of 100 councils employing 





FIGURE 1.1  Australian Local Government Spending By Category, 1994-95 (Total Outlays $8.2 billion)
FIGURE 1.2  Australian Local Government Spending By Category, 2014-15 (Total Outlays $33.6 billion)
SOURCE: AUSTRALIAN BUREAU OF STATISTICS, 2016
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FIGURE 1.3  Australian Local Government Expenditure by Function and Jurisdiction, 2014-15 
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Three causes are often cited for the functional 
expansion of Australian local government 
expenditure. These include cost-shifting (whereby 
unfunded or partially funded mandates are 
imposed on local government by higher tiers of 
government), the need to address market failure 
(particularly in rural areas where it is commonly not 
financially viable for the private sector to provide 
essential goods and services such as aged care 
or childcare) and increasing community demand 
(which is said to be ‘rising at an exponential rate’.7* 
As to the first of these factors, the solution is 
relatively straight forward (although politically 
difficult to implement) – a commitment to the 
proposition that the tier of government instigating 
a mandate is responsible for funding that mandate. 
To ensure this occurs, a suitably resourced and 
independent statutory institution should provide 
oversight. The second cause of functional 
expansion is most salient to rural and regional 
councils and should be reflected in appropriate 
grant transfers. The final matter – recognising 
community demand – represents the substantive 
component of our present inquiry.
The key argument of this paper is that the financial 
sustainability of local government is threatened by 
the erosion of the link between local government 
expenditure and local government revenue. When 
inadequate price signals are sent to resident-
consumers, then an inefficient quantity and 
quality of local government goods and services 
is likely to result.8 Put simply, price (while not the 
only important consideration) has information 
value for consumers and producers of goods and 
services. If we fail to accurately signal the price 
of local government goods and services then an 
inefficient pattern of consumption of these goods 
and services will arise.9 We argue that the current 
revenue sources for local governments deviate 
from the desired link thus eliciting demand for 
local government goods and services which is not 
tempered by willingness to pay considerations.10 
However, it is possible to strengthen the 
link between local government revenue and 
expenditure and recommendations to achieve 
precisely this outcome form the substantive 
contribution of the paper. 
Part Two examines the principle sources of local 
government revenue with a view to demonstrating 
how the current application erodes the link and 
hence financial sustainability. Part Three presents 
the results of our interviews with key stakeholders 
with an emphasis on identifying the obstacles for 
reform, whilst Part Four outlines important research 
which remains outstanding. The paper ends with a 
consideration of the public policy implications and 
direction for future research.
*  In fact, looking over the last few decades of local government expenditure there is no trend (linear or exponential) in growth. Rather expenditure growth is ‘lumpy’ – periods of rapid 
growth followed by periods of relatively muted growth. However, it is clearly the case that growth in local expenditure – when considered over a long time horizon – occur at rates which 
appear to be unsustainable.
16





Part 2: Assessing  
The Balance Sheets of 
Local Governments
The Link Between Revenue and Expenditure  
Must Be Re-Established 
Figure 2.1 details the major sources of local government revenue which can be broadly 
classified as: taxation (38%), grants and subsidies (11%) and sales of goods and services 
(27%). Before any judgements can be made regarding whether the sources of revenue 
are appropriate for the goods and services provided by local government, it is first 
necessary to understand the basic types of outputs produced by the sector. 
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The mandate of government is to produce public 
goods and services.11 Pure public goods are items 
which are both non-excludable, which means 
that it is not possible to prevent consumption 
– for instance, one cannot be prevented from 
driving down a public road; and non-rival, which 
means that consumption by one individual does 
not affect the quantity of the good available for 
consumption by others – for instance, the number 
of times one person drives down a road doesn't 
materially reduce the ability of others to drive 
down the same road. The common examples 
cited for pure public goods are street lighting and 
local roads. 
At the opposite extreme lie private goods and 
services. Local government examples of these 
include aged care and sale of compost produced 
from green waste depots. In between these two 
extremes are merit goods, which are provided by 
governments in the belief that consumption has 
some intrinsic virtue which may be internalised 
– for example, swimming pools and libraries; and 
goods with positive externalities, which have 
benefits beyond those which can be internalised 
by the individual consuming the good – for 
instance, sewerage and solid waste disposal. 
It is important to be conscious of the different 
types of local government goods and services, 
as the source of funding should ideally respond 
to the characteristics of consumption. When this 
association is not observed, then inequity and 
inefficient levels of consumption result.








FIGURE 2.1  Types of Goods and Services Local Governments Provide 
Type Characteristics Examples
PUBLIC GOODS Non-excludable; non-rival Street lighting; local roads
MERIT GOODS Intrinsic value which may be internalised Public swimming pools; libraries
GOODS WITH  
POSITIVE EXTERNALITIES
Benefits are beyond  
individual internalisation Sewerage; waste disposal services
PRIVATE GOODS  
AND SERVICES
Goods and services provided by  
local government and also often 
provided by private businesses
Aged care; compost produced  
from green waste depots
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Local Government Taxation  
is Often Employed Inappropriately
It has been deemed that local government 
taxation is the appropriate source of revenue for 
the provision of local government public goods 
and services.12 Due to the non-excludability 
characteristic of pure public goods, it is simply 
not possible to sustainably fund what are 
generally considered to be essential goods and 
services through any other means. 
It is also deemed appropriate to fund the 
subsidy component of merit goods and services 
that have public benefit through the common 
tax pool.*  
However, local government taxation is often 
employed inappropriately. One common error 
is to wholly or partially fund private goods 
from the common tax pool. When this occurs 
‘substantial benefits are provided to a few while 
imposing small costs on many’.13 Indeed, this has 
been regarded as the main reason for expanding 
government budgets, resulting in economic 
distortions and all manner of social ills.14  
The problem is perpetuated by both the political 
rewards attendant upon acquiescence to rent-
seeking lobbies and the rational ignorance of 
individual citizens (because the disaggregated 
cost is indeed small it simply does not pay for 
individuals to protest against the practice).15 The 
main problem with this practice – apart from the 
obvious inequity – is that individuals or small 
groups obtaining benefits at the expense of the 
wider community will fail to receive an adequate 
price signal and thus demand an inefficient level 
and quality of the good. 
The other error, almost universally made in 
relation to the use of the local government tax 
pool, also relates to the absence of an adequate 
price signal for merit goods and services. As 
noted earlier, it is entirely appropriate to use 
taxation to provide the subsidy component of 
merit and positive externality goods – failure to 
subsidise the goods in this manner will result 
in a lower than optimal level of consumption. 
Moreover, the provision of a subsidy is a key 
justification for decentralised government 
embodied in local government. The problem 
is that the level of subsidy is rarely, if ever, 
communicated to the donors (the wider body of 
local government taxpayers) or the recipients. 
Failure to communicate the level of subsidy 
to donors can manifest in unhelpful calls 
for the implementation of local government 
tax limitations. On the other hand, failure to 
communicate the level of subsidy to recipients 
fails, once again, to send an adequate price 
signal to consumers of merit and positive 
externality goods. In the absence of a price 
signal, consumers will tend to demand an 
inefficiently high quantity and quality of the 
subsidised local government good. In addition, 
failure to signal the level of subsidy fails to set up 
the conditions of moral empathy which underpin 
the enhanced effectiveness of decentralised 
governments.16 
Irrespective of how local government taxation is 
employed, it is critical for economic efficiency, 
equity and financial sustainability that it is raised 
in an appropriate manner. The scholarly literature 
is almost unanimous in its endorsement of the 
use of property based taxation for subnational 
government.17 The principal reasons for this 
preference are the immobility of the tax base, 
the transparency of the tax impost, relative 
stability, ease of administration and allocative 
efficiency. Immobility is an especially important 
trait for a subnational tax because of the 
relative ease of migration between subnational 
governments which might otherwise result in 
destructive tax competition. Put simply, one 
cannot export a land tax base to an international 
tax haven nor can one readily move a land 
tax base to a more favourable national tax 
jurisdiction. The transparency and visibility of 
a land based tax ‘is a desirable feature from a 
decision-making perspective’18 giving rise to a 
clear link between taxation on the one hand, and 
expenditure on public goods and subsidies on 
the other. Land tax is also a relatively stable base 
– unlike income tax or mineral royalties - and 
the tax impost is largely resistant to economic 
shocks. Moreover, land tax is recognised to be 
generally allocative efficient - it does not distort 
spending decisions – although this is dependent 
on the taxation method employed.19 





There is Scope to Increase  
Australia’s Land Tax Impositions 
The next question to be posed in relation to local government 
taxation is whether there is scope to increase the size of 
the impost. Table 2.3 details the OECD countries which levy 
a higher proportion of property tax (levied by all tiers of 
government) as a percentage of GDP than Australia (Australia 
is ranked 11th in the OECD). 
Two notable facts emerge: (i) Australia levies a far higher 
proportion of property tax than the OECD average and 
(ii) Australia has marginally reduced the proportion of tax 
levied when considered over the last two decades (relative 
to GDP) during a period when the typical OECD country 
increased property taxation. However, it should be noted that 
these figures reflect total national property tax take: local 
government in Australia collect just over a third of the national 
property tax.20 On balance it appears – contrary to some 
arguments21  – that there may be little room for higher rates of 
property taxation unless state governments (which dominate 
the space) were to reduce their imposts (which is unlikely).*
Country 1993 2003 2013
UNITED KINGDOM 3 3.9 4
FRANCE 2.7 3 3.8
BELGIUM 1.7 2 3.5
CANADA 3.9 3.5 3.2
USA 3 3 2.9
LUXEMBURG 2.7 2.9 2.8
ITALY 2.2 3.1 2.7
ISRAEL n/a 2.8 2.7
JAPAN 3.1 2.6 2.7
GREECE 1 1.4 2.6
AUSTRALIA 2.7 2.8 2.6
OECD AVERAGE 1.8 1.8 1.9
TABLE 2.3  Property Tax as a Percentage of GDP, OECD, 2003 and 2013
SOURCE: OECD 2016
* Indeed, recent suggestion in the media that revenue capture could be employed as an innovative method of funding infrastructure development suggests that the Federal government may be 
considering the imposition of a property based levy. This would further crowd out the space for local government and reduce the potential for tax increases. Moreover, the idea that revenue capture 
is somehow innovative is rather strange given that it is the moral imperative behind existing local government property taxation – first articulated by Henry George well over a century ago.
RECOMMENDATION 1 
Local government taxation should 
only be used to fund local government 
public goods and the subsidised 
component of merit goods and 
positive externality goods. Local 
government taxation is most decidedly 
not a fee for service.
RECOMMENDATION 2 
The level of subsidy should be justified 
and clearly communicated to donors 
and recipients. Subsidy components can 
be indicated through footnotes on rating 
assessments and by clear display of 
subsidy on receipts and at places where 
subsidised goods and services have 
been provided.
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RECOMMENDATION 3 
Higher tiers of government should be 
discouraged from crowding-out the local 
government tax base. Ideally, retreat by state 
governments is desirable, but may not be 
practical. Moreover, serious consideration 
should be given to returning Capital Gains Tax 
(CGT) relating to subdivision of land to local 
governments (which bear the costs of providing 
infrastructure related to the subdivision). If it is 
not possible for the Australian Taxation Office 
to identify and transfer these amounts to local 
government then the same effect could be 
achieved by local governments levying a tax-
deductible fee on subdivisions equivalent to 
CGT liabilities. 
Exemptions and Concessions  
Lead to Inequitable Burdens  
on Taxpayers
Two other important points should be considered 
in relation to efficiency and effectiveness of local 
government taxation in Australia: (i) the existence 
of a wide range of concessions and exemptions 
and (ii) the increasing use of tax limitations 
(commonly referred to as rate capping). 
Exemptions and concessions are not desirable in 
view of the fact that they reduce equity – every 
concession or exemption clearly imposes a 
higher burden on the remaining taxpayers – and 
erode the link between revenue and expenditure. 
Exemptions include benevolent foundations, 
places of worship, schools, properties occupied 
by other tiers of government, sporting grounds 





notable concessions include those given to crown 
land and buildings occupied by State and Federal 
Government, and the pensioner discounts, which 
generally reflect an unfunded mandate of state 
governments. 
While this report does not advocate for the removal 
of all exemptions, a review of existing exemptions 
and concessions should be instigated in order 
to remove those that are not within the funded 
mandate of local governments. Because apart from 
representing a threat to the financial sustainability 
of councils, exemptions and concessions are an 
incorrect assignment of responsibility amongst tiers 
of government and an example of cost-shifting 
(via unfunded mandate). This is because the policy 
in effect subsidises retired couples to continue to 
occupy family sized properties – rather than shift 
into smaller accommodation. While we of course 
are not suggesting that retired individuals should 
be forced from their family home, it is clearly 
undesirable to subsidise continued occupancy in 
large residential properties. It should be noted in 
relation to exemptions and concessions that the 
provision of welfare is not a sub-national function 
under any specification of fiscal federalism owing to 
both capacity and inefficient migration problems.22  
There is, thus, strong grounds for abandoning this 
practice on both the link between revenue and 
expenditure and fiscal responsibility considerations. 
RECOMMENDATION 4 
Exemptions and concessions should be reduced 
and abandoned wherever possible. Welfare is the 
legitimate responsibility of federal governments. 
If exemptions and concessions are desired 
then they should be provided outside of the 
local government tax cycle, to preserve the 
link between revenue and expenditure. These 
can include discounts for pensioners as well as 
exemptions on crown or other government lands.
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Council Rates Should Be  
Applied with More Transparency
A notable aspect of local government taxation 
is the use of various differential rate categories. 
Generally different rate categories exist for 
residential, commercial, agricultural and mining 
enterprises, although many councils use multiple 
sub categories for levying rates. Two serious 
problems exist in relation to this practice. First, 
it is almost impossible to find data on local 
government taxation expressed in cents in the 
dollar of land value terms, which is the  most 
common way of calculating rates. This is entirely 
unsatisfactory as the lack of transparency 
aides rent-seeking activities of special interest 
groups. Secondly, certain categories of rates – in 
particular taxation for agricultural enterprises – 
typically attract substantial concessions, whilst 
other business categories such as commercial 
enterprises typically pay a premium rate of local 
government taxation.*
It is important that a justification is provided 
for this practice which responds to the nature 
of local government rates: that is, rates are a 
form of taxation, not a fee for service, as is often 
misconceived. Nor is income re-distribution a 
legitimate function of sub-national government.23 
It is thus difficult to see how different rates of local 
government taxation can be justified – particularly 
for different business enterprises. 
RECOMMENDATION 5 
Every council should be required to make 
public the calculation method of each of the 
differential rate categories (in an accessible 
form), in order to increase transparency and 
thus reduce opportunity for rent-seeking. 
Comparative differential rate category data 
(expressed in cents in the dollar terms) should 
be clearly stated on all local government rate 
notices.
Rate Capping is Destroying Local 
Government Efficiency  
and Effectiveness
Rate capping also erodes the link between 
revenue and expenditure and distorts the overall 
efficiency and effectiveness of local government 
taxation. Proponents of rate capping assert that 
it: (i) prevents the misuse of monopoly powers 
of local governments, (ii) prevents the provision 
of non-core services and infrastructure and (iii) 
improves local government efficiency. 
Conversely, opponents of rate capping commonly 
argue that it: (i) increases debt, (ii) increases 
infrastructure backlogs, (iii) elicits blame shifting 
and learned helplessness and (iv) introduces inter-
jurisdictional inequity (different levels of revenue 
effort** across jurisdictions). It is commonly held 
that the reduction in taxation revenue is the 
biggest problem associated with rate capping. 
However, we believe that the erosion of the link 
between revenue and expenditure leading to 
fiscal illusion and resulting unsustainable levels of 
demand is a much larger problem.24 
Somewhat surprisingly, the empirically 
contestable claims regarding the advantages 
and disadvantages of rate capping remained 
unexamined in the Australian scholarly literature 
until early this year. Those various claims were 
tested in a 2016 comparative study between 
NSW (which at the time of the study was the 
only jurisdiction in Australia operating a pervasive 
rate cap regime) and Victoria (just prior to the 
recent introduction in rate capping).25 They found 
empirical evidence to suggest that the councils 
operating under a rate cap regime did indeed 
have higher levels of inter-jurisdictional revenue 
effort inequity (but significantly lower rates of 
revenue effort – see, table 2.4), higher liabilities 
per assessment, lower rates of infrastructure 
renewal and lower levels of efficiency. 
This study provides empirical evidence against 
the desirability of tax limitations which is 
consistent with overseas experiences. Moreover, 
the authors demonstrate that there are more 
efficacious methods of achieving the objectives 
of rate capping proponents according to personal 
*  It is conceded that rates on business and farm properties represent a deduction on income taxation and thus could be used as an argument for relatively higher rates for these categories of 
property. However, this exporting of local government taxation (as it is referred to in the literature), also applies to landlords of residential property – thus, on this basis alone there is an argument 
for higher rates for residential rental properties. However, the export of taxation liabilities is not a desirable element of a federation and we certainly don’t promote the practice. Moreover, the tax 
deductibility argument fails to explain why farm business should be subject to lower rates than other businesses – given that they are often subject to the same federal taxation rules. 





FIGURE 2.4  Revenue Effort Equity NSW and Victoria, 2012 (%)
Smallest Largest Average
NSW (STATE) 0.61 3.30 1.39
VICTORIA (STATE) 0.91 2.62 1.75
NSW URBAN 0.61 3.30 1.52
VICTORIA URBAN 0.91 2.62 1.69
NSW RURAL 0.33 2.37 1.12
VICTORIA RURAL 1.1 2.57 1.84
finance perspectives. Personal finance theory 
‘hinges on the perceived value of local services 
relative to the tax burden imposed’.26  
Thus, measures which enhance the perception 
of value will put downward pressure on populist 
calls for rate capping. Such measures include 
removing exemptions and concessions, providing 
information on subsidy to donors and recipients, 
enabling councils to implement taxation increases 
on a more frequent basis to reduce the likelihood 
of rate shock (the authors recommend flexibility 
on a quarterly basis) and adherence to user 
pricing for non-public services.27  
It’s a fair assumption that in general, property 
owners are sceptical of councils over-taxing  
and mismanaging funds. Thus remedies 
under this approach would focus on reducing 
information costs through addressing existing 
asymmetries and providing an avenue for redress 
outside of the electoral cycle (an appropriately 
funded Ombudsman with broad powers which 
include the ability to investigate claims of rent-
seeking activities).
RECOMMENDATION 6 
Rate capping should be abandoned as a matter 
of priority. Local government tax limitations (rate 
capping) erode the link between revenue and 
expenditure and diminish financial efficiency and 
sustainability. 
RECOMMENDATION 7 
A local government ombudsman, with broader 
remits, should be established in each jurisdiction 
to provide opportunity for sanction outside of 
the electoral cycle. The responsibilities of the 
ombudsman could be to review governance 
issues but also rent-seeking activities which 
disadvantage the broader local government 
taxpayer community, and monitor cost-shifting 
behaviour.
RECOMMENDATION 8 
Councils should be provided with the flexibility 
to make incremental adjustments to local 
government taxation on a quarterly cycle.
NOTE: RESIDENTIAL REVENUE EFFORT IS THE TOTAL FEES AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT 
TAXES EXPRESSED AS A PROPORTION OF INCOMES FOR INDIVIDUALS.
SOURCE: DREW AND DOLLERY, 2016
Figure 2.4 displays the 
revenue effort – or local 
government fees and 
taxes as a proportion of 
individual incomes – that 
residents must pay in 
different regions of New 
South Wales and Victoria. 
As can be seen, people 
living in rural Victoria paid 
the highest proportion 
(1.84 per cent on average) 
of their incomes to local 
governments in 2012, but 
some local governments 
in urban New South 
Wales derived as much 
as 3.3 per cent of average 
residents’ incomes in the 
same period.
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Local Government Fees and 
Charges Should Be Re-Assessed
We have already noted that where local 
government provides private goods and services, 
it is imperative that benefit pricing is observed. 
Failure to price private goods appropriately 
not only erodes the link between revenue and 
expenditure but also induces an inefficient 
quantity and quality of production as well as 
creating inequity for the wider cohort of local 
government taxpayers. Furthermore, we have 
noted that merit goods and goods with positive 
externalities should only have the subsidy 
component funded from the common tax pool, 
with the remainder funded by fees and charges 
imposed on the beneficiaries. 
Many scholars and stakeholders have asserted 
that government does not have a legitimate 
role in providing private goods.28 However, this 
is really just a normative judgement based on 
political philosophy which cannot be adequately 
addressed in a paper of this length. However, 
where market failure is evident, there is a clear 
and unequivocal role for local government, hence 
the need for a brief review of pricing concepts.*
Local Government Goods 
and Services Must Be Priced 
Accordingly
In essence, there are two approaches to the 
problem of setting appropriate fees and charges: 
a supply-side methodology and a demand-side 
approach. A supply side approach seeks to price 
goods and services at a long run marginal cost 
(which is the cost of producing an additional 
unit with all factors of production accounted 
for).29 An approach of this type promotes 
financial sustainability and equity. However, the 
calculation of the long run marginal cost is far 
from a simple matter. For instance, the ‘lumpy’ 
nature of facilitating additional capacity, seasonal 
consumption patterns and cost differentials 
based on geographic proximity can conspire to 
confound estimates.30 Moreover, it has long been 
noted that local government accounting systems 
are simply not up to the task.31 Furthermore, 
where private goods are supplied in response to 
market failure, prices calculated through a supply-
side approach would likely be beyond the reach 
of citizen-consumers, thus entirely defeating the 
purpose of the intervention. 
* We note that this is a matter which relates principally to rural councils. However, there are many examples of the market failure rhetoric being applied where there are, in fact, market 





The alternate demand-side approach minimises 
market distortion in the local economy, but may 
not recover costs, and thus not contribute to 
financial sustainability or equity. The simplest 
application of demand-side pricing is to 
conduct price benchmarking, whereby goods 
and services are priced according to the level 
charged by private producers or adjoining 
municipalities. However, this is problematic 
for the case of market failure, as there will 
not be existing private providers in the local 
government area – although the market price in 
comparable areas could be invoked; or where 
adjoining municipalities do not employ a robust 
method for pricing goods and services (which is 
commonly the case). 
Needless to say, the regulation of fees and 
charges – which occur in some jurisdictions 
– erodes the link between revenue and 
expenditure and is contraindicated for much 
the same reasons as rate capping (that is, it 
necessarily dictates the cross-subsidisation of 
services, fails to send an adequate price signal 
and does not promote allocative efficiency). 
RECOMMENDATION 9 
A schedule of fees and charges should be 
publicly available for every council and fully 
justified according to a demand-side or supply-
side approach. This occurs in some jurisdictions, 
however, it is also important for the information 
to be both accessible and accessed by local 
government taxpayers.
RECOMMENDATION 10 
Regulated fees and charges should be abolished 
on the grounds that they erode the link between 
revenue and expenditure.
Fixed Minimum Fees Should  
Be Applied to Developer Levies
The final substantive aspect of local government 
fees and charges income relates to the 
contentious matter of developer levies. There 
is a strong economic case for the imposition of 
developer levies to cover the cost of additional 
infrastructure attendant upon new developments 
– once again, the key idea is to send an adequate 
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price signal. By forcing developers to internalise 
some of the costs associated with developments, 
allocative efficiency is enhanced – that is, 
developers will be motivated to produce a more 
appropriate quantity of development in the areas 
of greatest social value. This should encourage 
‘in-fill’ developments, discourage urban sprawl 
and make better use of existing infrastructure 
capacity.32 Moreover, it has been argued that 
it is equitable to shift the costs of supporting 
infrastructure onto those who directly benefit 
from the public investment.33
However, developer charges are far from 
problem free and this has given rise to a good 
deal of litigation. Matters of dispute usually 
revolve around establishing a sufficient link 
between the development and the supporting 
infrastructure, estimating the benefit region of 
public infrastructure and calculating the long-run 
marginal cost for associated public infrastructure. 
The costs involved in calculating and defending 
developer levies are so great that many councils 
fall back on voluntary agreements and some 
councils eschew developer levies entirely. 
It is a somewhat surprising fact that in some 
jurisdictions regulators have imposed a ceiling 
on developer levies but not a floor. The recent 
implementation of fixed minimum levies in 
Victoria can be broadly considered a positive 
development in this field in terms of promoting 
financial sustainability and going some way 
towards establishing a link between revenue 
and service demand (provided that they are 
not misinterpreted as regulated fees – councils 
must still be able to capture the full cost of 
additional infrastructure).
RECOMMENDATION 11 
A floor on developer levies should be legislated 
to prevent councils from eschewing developer 
levies entirely, or imposing an inadequate levy 
out of fear of litigation. However, it is important 
that legislation clearly provides councils with the 
opportunity to pursue higher fees and charges 
when justified. In addition, caps on developer 
charges should be removed on the basis that they 
erode the link between revenue and expenditure 
and financial sustainability.
Intergovernmental Grants  
Are an Integral Part of  
the Federation
Intergovernmental grant transfers are a necessary 
counterpart to federations. Of late there has 
been lot of commentary which suggests that 
own source revenue is inherently virtuous and 
intergovernmental transfers are somehow 
undesirable. This interpretation is simply incorrect 
and ignores the underlying disparities which 
exist in every federation and the desirability of 
correcting them.
Intergovernmental grants seek to redress 
inequities which exist along two dimensions: 
vertical fiscal imbalance and horizontal fiscal 
imbalance. Vertical fiscal imbalance (VFI) arises 
from the fact that subnational taxes must be 
levied on a relatively immobile base in order 
to avoid inefficient migration of capital and 
labour as well as destructive sub-national 
taxation competition. Moreover, as noted and 
demonstrated in the tax assignment literature, 
progressive taxation – particularly income 
taxation – can only be effectively levied by 
the federal tier. As a result, higher tiers of 
government generally levy taxes well in excess 
of their immediate responsibilities – for instance, 
the federal government levies 80.1% of taxation 
nationally whilst local government levies just 
3.5%. Vertical fiscal imbalance will always exist 
because of the fundamental nature of federations. 
The only relevant question is how much of the 
taxation revenue collected by the federal tier 
should be reallocated and on what basis should 
the allocations occur.
This brings us naturally to the second characteristic 
of federations which requires mitigation through 
grant transfers: horizontal fiscal imbalance (HFI), 
or a situation in which local governments find 
themselves in dissimilar financial situations but 
with similar financial commitments. Because a 
federation is comprised of decentralised units with 
different wealth, levels of industrialisation, natural 
endowments, climate and topography, horizontal 
fiscal imbalance is almost certain to occur. The 
essential point is that different local governments 
will have different revenue raising capabilities and 
different expenditure needs. A system of inelastic 





methodology is therefore essential in order to (i) 
eliminate inefficient migration of capital and labour, 
(ii) reduce the opportunities for pork-barrelling, 
(iii) eliminate wasteful lobbying,34 and (iv) reduce 
the potential for political conflict.35 In addition, 
horizontal fiscal equalisation (HFE) grants, 
which are intergovernmental grants designed to 
mitigate the imbalance between different local 
governments, are required to respond to the 
normative proposition that ‘different persons 
should be treated similarly unless they are 
dissimilar in some relevant respect’.36  
Intergovernmental Grants  
Should Preserve the Link Between 
Demand and Willingness to Pay
If we accept the strong arguments in the 
corpus of scholarly literature for a system of 
intergovernmental grants, then the next task is to 
specify its desirable traits. It is important to note 
that intergovernmental grants carry significant 
risks: in particular, grant transfers erode the link 
between demand and willingness to pay. Thus, 
the scholarly literature contains a number of 
studies on the fiscal illusion they create – the well-
known flypaper effect.37 
Therefore, a desirable feature of 
intergovernmental grants is that they preserve, 
wherever possible, the link between demand 
and willingness to pay. This can be accomplished 
by allocating HFE grants directly to the 
householder (by way of rebate outside of the 
local government taxation cycle) rather than to 
the council. This practice would re-establish the 
crucial link between demand for public goods 
and the subsidy component of merit and positive 
externality goods, because increases in the 
provision would be met with noticeable increases 
to the local government tax impost. 
RECOMMENDATION 12 
Intergovernmental grant transfers made with 
the objective of mitigating horizontal fiscal 
imbalance should be paid directly to the local 
government taxpayer by way of a rebate 
outside of the local government tax cycle. This 
will help to re-assert the link between demand 
and willingness to pay.
Intergovernmental Grants  
Should Be Allocated Transparently
The second desirable trait is for 
intergovernmental grants to be inelastic and 
based on robust empirical methodology. 
This condition is important given the ever-
present threat to communities via soft budget 
constraints.38 If grants are elastic owing to a 
lack of transparency, consistency and robust 
empirical methodology, then this deficiency may 
be exploited by local governments to expand 
services to unsustainable levels at the expense of 
the wider community. 
For example, a local government may run 
successive deficits and take on unsustainable levels 
of debt and then lobby to have intergovernmental 
grants increased in order to address the resultant 
liquidity crisis. There are many examples 
of brinkmanship games of this sort in the 
international literature,39 however, we also have an 
example of precisely this behaviour by a remote 
NSW council.40 Exploitation of soft budgets 
is an ongoing risk because Australia does not 
allocate intergovernmental grants in a transparent, 
consistent and empirically robust manner.
RECOMMENDATION 13 
Financial assistance grants should be allocated 
by a central national authority free of political 
interference.
Intergovernmental Grants  
Should Be Linked to a Predictable 
Source of Revenue
The third desirable trait of a system of 
intergovernmental grants transfers is that they 
are linked to a predictable and growing source of 
revenue. Much has been written about the three 
year freeze to financial assistance grants which 
was implemented in order to attempt to arrest 
the decline in the federal budgetary position.41 
This event underlines the need for legislation 
to link financial assistance grants to a source of 
federal revenue – and doing so would also go 
some way to arresting VFI over time. 
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Under the Fraser Government’s Local 
Government (Personal Income Tax Sharing) Act 
1976, grants were linked to a growing source of 
federal tax receipts according to a share which 
was initially set at 1.52% and rising to 2.00% in 
1985. In a similar vein, it was originally proposed 
that local government would be allocated a 
fixed proportion of GST revenues, however, this 
plan was abandoned after negotiations with the 
senate substantially reduced the scope of the 
consumption tax.42  
We do not believe that a call for an increase 
in financial assistance grants is a practical 
proposition at present given the pressures on 
the federal budget. However, linking these grants 
to a source of federal revenue, such as a fixed 
percentage of the combined quantum of income 
and corporate taxation, may be a politically 
acceptable proposition with clear long term 
benefits. If the legislation was modified to reflect 
this and the other recommendations then the 
result would be a system of intergovernmental 
grants which are more predictable, equitable, 
transparent and consistent.
Councils do receive other specific purpose grants 
– particularly in the form of matching grants. 
We do not review this practice because it can 
be a unreliable source of revenue, which is not 
specifically tied to structural characteristics of the 
federation. However, we will note that matching 
grants can act to disadvantage councils with limited 
resources: particularly, councils with relatively little 
opportunity to raise own-source revenue (such as 
rural councils) exacerbated by taxation limitations 
and regulated fees and charges.
RECOMMENDATION 14 
Financial assistance grants should be linked to 
a predictable and growing source of revenue to 
ensure financially sustainable local government. 
The most likely path to achieving this aim is for 
the grants to be linked to a share of personal and 
corporate income tax revenues for which the 
allowed amount is no more than the existing grant 
allocation. However, if reform of the GST was to 
be seriously contemplated by federal, state and 
territory governments, then a case could be made 
for local government to be allocated a share of 
this consumption tax.
RECOMMENDATION 15 
Authorities issuing matching grants should 
be conscious of the constraints imposed on 
councils which have limited revenue raising 
capacity. Particularly councils operating in an 
environment dictated by taxation limitations and 
regulated fees.
Financial Assistance Grants  
Are Currently Not Achieving  
Their Mandate
The major source of grant transfers to address 
imbalance are the financial assistance grants 
provided by the federal government according 
to the Local Government (Financial Assistance) 
Act 1995. The Act states that grants should be 
allocated according to the principle of horizontal 
fiscal equalisation (HFE), which it defines thus:
(a) Each local governing body in a state is able to 
function, by reasonable effort, at a standard 
not lower than the average standard of other 
local governing bodies in the state; and 
(b) Takes account of differences in the expenditure 
required to be incurred by local governing 
bodies in the performance of their functions 
and in their capacity to raise revenue.’43 
However, for some time it has been evident to 
scholars that financial assistance grants are 
not achieving their legislated purpose. The 
first reason for this failure is the stipulation in 
section 6(2)(b) of the Act of a minimum allowed 
amount of ‘no less than the amount that would 
be allocated to the body if 30 per cent of the 
amount to which the State is entitled under that 
section in respect to the year were allocated 
among local government bodies in the state on 
a per capita basis’. This section of the Act clearly 
subverts the HFE objectives and is compounded 
by the fact that initial allocations to the states 
are also made on a per capita basis. 
The second reason why the grants fail to achieve 
HFE is that they are allocated by state local 
government grants commissions rather than by 
a single national office. This practice occurs as 
a result of the commonly held belief that direct 
funding of local government would be ‘vulnerable 
to constitutional challenge if anyone had the 
standing and motivation to take such an action’.44* 
 *  It is by no means certain that this is indeed the case and we note that the Commonwealth has been allocating Road to Recovery grants directly to local government for the last 16 years and 





The reason why state and territory allocation is 
problematic is that each and every jurisdiction 
is allocating the grants in a completely different 
and often opaque manner. Moreover, most 
of the allocation methodologies are chaotic 
and empirically indefensible.45 There are well 
developed robust methodologies for allocating 
intergovernmental grants and it is something 
of a mystery as to why none of the local 
government grant commissions have adopted a 
defensible approach.46 
RECOMMENDATION 16 
Section 6(2)(b) of the Local Government 
(Financial Assistance) Act 1995 should be 
repealed. This section of the Act subverts 
principles of horizontal fiscal equalisation, 
compounding other inequitable stipulations. 
RECOMMENDATION 17 
Financial assistance grants should be allocated 
on the basis of robust empirical methodology 
which principally responds to horizontal fiscal 
imbalance. There already exists an empirically 
robust methodology that has been demonstrated 
in the scholarly literature since at least 1989.
The Risks of Local Governments 
Taking on Debt Should Be 
Appropriately Considered
A number of commentators have recently 
advocated for local governments to take on 
higher levels of debt in order to mitigate rising 
infrastructure backlogs.47 However, the matter is 
nowhere near as simple as has been presented 
and it can be a cause for concern that the 
discussion to this point has not adequately 
considered the potential risks.
First, it is important to clarify a common and 
pervasive misconception: debt is not a source 
of revenue. All debt can do is to bring forward 
future revenues. Debt must be repaid as must 
the cost of debt. 
The second problem to recognise in relation to 
the use of debt is the matter of intergenerational 
equity. Proponents of debt regularly cite 
intergenerational equity as a strong reason for 
the use of debt – the idea being that long-lived 
assets funded by the current generation of local 
government taxpayers will be in use by successive 
generations long after those who funded the 
infrastructure have moved on. However, this 
argument does not stand up to close scrutiny 
given the fact that the current generation has 
benefitted from infrastructure funded by previous 
generations.48 Thus, to achieve the much lauded 
intergenerational equity, it is readily apparent that 
we must also exact intergenerational inequity on 
earlier generations of local government taxpayers.*
A similar - and yet unresolved - moral hazard 
is also evident in relation to future generations. 
It is difficult to see how committing future 
generations of taxpayers to debt, without their 
consent – is in anyway morally licit. Moreover, 
there is a great risk that the fiscal commons of the 
next generation will be raided by incurring debt 
for current consumption or by borrowing for an 
inappropriate portion of infrastructure expense. 
These significant moral hazards do not appear 
to have been considered by those advocating 
that Australian local governments should take on 
higher levels of debt.**
There are two even more serious problems with 
the current arguments for local governments to 
take on more debt: erosion of the link between 
revenue and expenditure and introduction of soft-
budget constraints. As we have noted throughout 
this paper, expenditure and functional expansion 
in Australian local government is running at 
previously unseen unsustainable levels. It is thus 
of paramount importance that demands for 
additional services at the margin are tempered 
by willingness to pay considerations. Debt erodes 
this crucial link and therefore has an unintended 
consequence of fuelling higher levels of demand 
which could well result in a debt spiral. 
On the grounds of the link argument alone 
debt is clearly contraindicated. The second 
serious problem associated with debt is that it 
opens up yet another channel of soft-budget 
constraints which can manifest as a raid on the 
fiscal commons. Moreover, when considered in 
 * There are also substantial obstacles owing to the fact that Australia does not have a mature municipal bond market or bond bank. However, we believe that it is important to work through the 
moral hazard and linking problems before even countenancing appropriate bond products and market structures.
** We do note, however, that it is politically expedient for politicians of the current generation (particularly politicians of higher tiers of government) to advocate debt as a quick fix to the 
infrastructure backlog – it will be local government politicians (in particular) of the next generation (and the taxpayers of the next generation) who will likely have to deal with the fallout when 
things go awry. 
32





conjunction with existing chaotic and 
elastic grant allocations the risk seems 
particularly high.
Before debt is countenanced as a 
systematic option for addressing 
local government infrastructure 
backlogs, mechanisms for addressing 
the substantial moral hazards and 
defending the link between revenue and 
expenditure must first be articulated. It is 
also important before encouraging local 
government to take on debt that careful 
debt capacity modelling be conducted 
(which is currently occurring in at least 
one Australian jurisdiction). 
RECOMMENDATION 18 
Robust empirical analysis of debt 
capacity should be conducted to 
support the analysis of the suitability 
of local government borrowings. 
It is imperative that, before local 
governments take on debt, the 
mechanisms for mitigating the moral 
hazards posed to past and future 
generations are clearly understood. 
Should the preceding significant 
challenges be resolved, there is scope to 
improve the efficiency of debt through 
the establishment of a bond bank or 
similar institution. Similarly, borrowing for 
infrastructure that can support growth 
and future income can be useful for local 
governments, providing these other 
issues are first addressed.
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Part 3: Obstacles to change
We conducted semi-structured interviews with a range of stakeholders, including 
representatives of the state governments, scholars, local government peak bodies, 
special interest lobby groups, unions representing local government employees, 
and individual councils. Some of the comments arising from the interviews have 
been summarised below, along with our response.  
Rate-capping is Widely Derided, 
But Here to Stay Unless Reforms 
Are Undertaken
There was a general condemnation of rate-
capping from councils, peak bodies and 
lobby groups. As we have noted the scholarly 
community also condemns the practice. 
Moreover, it is not the reduced revenue which 
is the biggest problem associated with the 
practice, but rather the fiscal illusion which it 
generates amongst ratepayers.49 
However, one interviewee expressed wonder 
as to why a state government would instigate 
rate capping when it shifts the blame for rate 
rises to the state government. It is important 
to understand what purportedly motivates 
populist calls for rate-capping: the calls come 
about because efforts to match own-source 
revenue to the rapid increase in budget 
outlays (of over 7.3% per year each and every 
year over the last two decades) can put a 
strain on personal budgets. It seems to be a 
common perception that local governments’ 
stress is, in the main, a revenue problem. No 
matter how important we think the functional 
expansion is, this sort of growth in outlays 
cannot continue indefinitely. Eventually, efforts 
to fund the budgetary expansion exert a 
heavy burden on ratepayers (of this or future 
generations) while providing fertile ground for 
a politician of a higher tier of government to 
campaign on a platform of rate-capping. Thus 
it is likely that other jurisdictions will follow in 
the footsteps of NSW and Victoria.
Cost-Shifting is a  
Perennial Political Tool  
That Can Be Eradicated  
Through COAG
Cost-shifting is a perennial issue of concern 
for council representatives – and often 
the seat of blame for local government 
financial distress. Current efforts to expose 
the degree of cost-shifting have failed 
to mitigate the problem. We believe that 
the only resolution to this problem is a 
political agreement at the COAG level 
along the lines that the tier of government 
instigating a mandate is responsible for 
funding the mandate. In truth, cost-shifting 
affects all levels of government and occurs 
in both directions. Moreover, there is the 
potential to descend into destructive 
patterns of cost-shifting (including tax 
exporting) if an agreement is not reached. 
Undoubtedly, cost-shifting is a pressure 
on local government. However, the main 
problem associated with a failure to resolve 
the matter is that it will continue to be a 
convenient topic for political blame games 
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Reforms to  
Intergovernmental Grants  
Must Be Communicated Effectively
Two main themes arose from the various interviews 
in response to our material on intergovernmental 
grant transfers:
1. Grants should be targeted more effectively on 
the basis of need
2. Concern that the proposed allocation of HFE 
grants direct to householders would result in 
lower revenue for councils and less certainty 
when planning budgets.
Quite a few participants expressed their concern 
that the HFE grants were not being targeted 
towards communities of the greatest need. There 
seems to be general consensus that the legislation 
needs to be changed and that a robust and 
empirically defensible allocation methodology 
should be adopted. There was no specific response 
to the idea of having grants allocated directly by 
the Commonwealth Grant Commission; however, it 
seems quite clear that if we are to have a uniform 
approach across the nation then this transfer of 
allocation power must be executed. Moreover, 
there was some reason to believe that stakeholders 
might be confused about the purpose of HFE 
grants (which are a redistribution of wealth 
attendant upon progressive taxation which can 
only be executed by the highest tier of government 
in a federation). 
Some interviewees expressed concern that 
our proposal to provide HFE grants direct to 
householders would reduce the revenue of councils 
and increase the uncertainty in council budgeting. 
In fact, changing the method of paying HFE 
grants would have no immediate effect on council 
revenue nor would it make ratepayers any worse 
off. Moreover, it would reduce uncertainty in the 
budgetary process and discourage the federal 
government from manipulating the system. See 
Box 3.1 for a simple explanation of the proposal. 
We understand that this is a radical departure 
from current practice and that change can be 
disconcerting. However, it is also clear that current 
practice is failing on a number of fronts, thus 
suggesting the need for fresh thinking on the matter.
BOX 3.1
PROPOSAL  
TO PROVIDE  
HFE GRANTS  
DIRECTLY TO  






Suppose an individual lived in a council area where the annual rate bill was $2,300  
and the HFE grant was $200 (on a per assessment basis). Our proposal would simply 
mean that the council would issue a rates notice for $2,500, thus receiving exactly the 
same revenue. Moreover, the ratepayer would be no worse off because they would 
receive $200 directly from the federal government. 
The main difference would be that the link between demand and willingness to pay will have been r 
easserted and the ratepayer will be aware of the precise amount of the subsidy provided by the larger  
body of Australian taxpayers. Moreover, the council would have greater certainty in budgeting because  
they would be somewhat insulated from the variation in allocations which occur from year to year. 
An additional, and very important, benefit of the proposal would be that if future federal governments tried to 
manipulate the HFE component of grants to address their own budget problems, they would find themselves 
directly responsible to the individual ratepayers. Rather than councils having to launch, what have proven to be 
over time, largely ineffective campaigns to resist manipulation of financial assistance grants, the result would 
instead have ratepayers making their federal representative directly aware of their feelings on the matter.
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There is Support for an 
Independent Ombudsman
One interviewee drew our attention to the need 
for ‘independent umpires to be deployed more 
often – as too many matters regarding local 
government are politicised and decisions are not 
made on evidence or merit’. 
We agree with this sentiment and believe that it 
is validation for our call for Ombudsmen to be 
granted broader remits (see recommendation 7).
There are Mixed Feelings  
About Local Governments  
Taking on Debt
Our material on debt elicited a strong response 
from interviewees. Some stakeholders believed 
that in view of local governments ‘strong 
revenue sources’ and ‘low levels of debt’ that 
there was a clear case for ‘sensible borrowings’. 
However, as we have seen it might be hard to 
argue that local government has strong revenue 
sources – land tax is being crowded out by 
state governments and the federal government 
is considering a new foray into land tax; two 
jurisdictions operate rate capping regimes and 
state jurisdictions also regulate fees and charges. 
Moreover, the populist support for rate-capping 
in NSW and Victoria suggests that the revenue 
source is nowhere near as strong as one might 
hope. Moreover, ‘low levels of debt’ seem to be a 
relative concept – thus we note the importance 
of comprehensively measuring debt capacity. 
Yet another interviewee stated that there was a 
clear need for guidance for councils regarding 
‘responsible’ borrowing and how to navigate 
the moral hazards surrounding intergenerational 
equity. This same respondent noted – quite rightly 
– that it was important to separate out the debate 
on funding infrastructure from debates regarding 
debt in general. We agree entirely and note that 
we did draw attention to the undesirability of 
incurring debt to fund operational expenditure. 
Own-Source Revenue  
is a Serious Issue for  
Rural Councils
Interviewees drew our attention to the relatively 
limited opportunities for rural councils to raise 
own-source revenue (for instance, rural councils 
do not generally have much scope to raise 
revenue from car parking). This is a valid point 
and a factor which is explicitly considered in the 






The Path to Efficiency  
is Not as Simple as  
Amalgamating
One interviewee from a council expressed 
concern that potential efficiencies have been 
exhausted and wondered ‘what’s next?’ This is a 
particularly astute observation. 
For many decades, local government regulators 
have amalgamated, imposed performance 
management, tried to reduce information 
asymmetries through performance monitoring, 
reformed legislation and publicly exhorted councils 
to improve their efficiency and effectiveness. In 
response councils have cut costs and entered 
into arrangements which are purported to 
reduce expenditure (for instance, voluntary 
amalgamations and shared service agreements).
Yet the (scant) evidence suggests that the 
sustainability of local government continues to 
deteriorate. Clearly, the well-trod paths of local 
government reform are not paying the dividends 
which reform proponents might wish them to.
Things must change – no government can absorb 
increases in expenditure in the order of 7.3% per 
annum; year after year; decade after decade. Nor 
will local government taxpayers be able to absorb 
increases to the local government taxation in 
the order of 7.3% per annum on the same basis. 
Nor is it reasonable to believe that the solution is 
larger intergovernmental grants (no matter how 
desirable they might be): the federal government 
has its own budget issues, and the money from 
the federal government is ultimately paid for by 
much the same group of taxpayers who pay local 
government rates. 
If we want to improve the sustainability of local 
government then we have to do things differently.
The most important thing we can do is re-
establish the link between demand for local 
government goods and services and willingness 
to pay. Our recommendations relate principally to 
reasserting this balance which must exist in any 
sustainable system of government.
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Part 4: Directions  
for Future Research
We believe that there are a number of clear research priorities  
that have emerged from the undertaking of this report.
First, it is somewhat surprising – and alarming – that a comprehensive robust analysis of 
the financial sustainability of Australian Local Government has yet to be undertaken. We 
cannot know the scale of the assumed financial sustainability issues without undertaking 
a study which goes well beyond the current work comprised of a few financial ratios with 
arbitrary benchmarks. Instead, we must measure all of the dimensions of sustainability 
– debt, liquidity, risk, efficiency, resilience and budgetary accuracy – to gain a credible 
picture of the state of local government. This task should be made a priority given the 
national importance of the local government sector. 
Second, we have outlined the need for debt capacity modelling along with research 
to address the questions of moral hazard associated with debt. This need was also 
recognised by the various parties who participated in our interviews. It may be politically 
expedient to shift the infrastructure backlog onto the next generation of ratepayers, but 
this may not be either morally licit nor in the nation’s long-term interests. 
Third, several authors have demonstrated that our current system of intergovernmental 
grant transfers are not allocated according to a consistent and empirically defensible 
methodology. We therefore strongly recommend legislative changes and adoption of a 
sound empirical strategy for allocation.
There is also a clear need to put in place more formal and rigorous education for 
elected representatives and council staff. In addition, the democratic nature of local 
government requires education at the community level. Re-establishing the link between 
expenditures and revenues is a start in the education process. However, there is also 
good reason to believe that education via effective community engagement would pay 
handsome dividends for the sector. Our own experience in running deliberative panels 
which directly involve a representative group of citizens in the allocation of expenditure 
demonstrates that citizens are willing to work with local government to attain more 
sustainable futures if they are made aware of the issues and trade-offs. This suggests 
that it is time for local government and local government regulators to start reaching 
out to the community – not just when electoral cycles or political expediency dictates 
consultation, but rather on a regular basis and in a manner which treats ratepayers as 












This report has taken a wide-lens view of local 
governments, and has provided a series of 
recommendations that, if implemented, will allow 
councils to continue providing the services Australians 
have come to expect and enjoy, at a sustainable 
price, and in an equitable way.
The most important finding of this report is that the link between 
local government revenue and local government expenditure 
is broken. In the absence of such a link, demand for local 
government goods and services is not tempered by willingness to 
pay considerations. This has resulted in a level of demand which 
does not seem to be sustainable in the long-term. Additionally, 
much work must be done to improve the transparency and equity 
of intergovernmental grants, and to establish whether taking on 
debt is the right move for individual councils.
As we have demonstrated throughout this report, a holistic 
approach is required to address the concerns regarding the 
financial sustainability of the sector. To this end, we have made 
a total of 18 recommendations. Individual recommendations do 
have merit and may improve matters somewhat. However, only 
a complete overhaul of the way local government goods and 
services are paid for will ensure long-term sustainability. Moreover, 
it is clear that difficult decisions will need to be made and it is 
important that all stakeholders are genuinely involved in reforms. 
It is equally clear that we cannot continue in the same way as we 
have done in the past. Australians rely on local government goods 
and services on a daily basis, we must therefore make all efforts 
to ensure that Australians continue to be able to rely on local 
government goods and services into the future.
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